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If one is interested in the consequences of semiotics for the 
study of literary signification, one needs a reliable account of what 
semiotics is or says; and for that it may be important to reflect on 
the strange consequentiality of semiotics itself, for semiotics is not 
a continuous discipline with a progressive historical evolution.' 
Thinkers have often produced major insights about signs and 
signification, but semiotics is not the sum of insights about the 
sign. It comes into being when the problem of the sign is brought to 
the fore, made to organize a field-a consequential intellectual 
development. 
One consequence of the advent of semiotics is the creation of 
precursors and thus of a history. The history of semiotics involves 
not an ordinary causal sequence but that special historical relation- 
ship which Freud calls Nachtraglichkeit, whereby an experience not 
understood at the time it took place (such as witnessing a Primal 
Scene) is later invested with traumatic meaning and, as trauma, can 
then be treated as a cause of later events.' Semiotics now identifies, 
as the trauma which determined its character, the activities in the 
early years of this century of a strange couple, Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce. 
They are an ill-sorted couple. Saussure was a successful and 
respectable Swiss professor who had doubts about the foundations 
of linguistics as then practiced and therefore wrote practically 
nothing; but he did argue, in lectures that have come down to us 
through students' notes, that since language was a system of signs, 
linguistics ought to be part of a larger science of signs, «a science 
which would study the life of signs within society. We call it 
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semiology from the Greek semeion. It would teach us what signs 
consist of, what laws govern them. Since it does not yet exist we 
cannot say what it will be, but it has a right to existence; its place is 
ensured in advance.» 
These suggestions were not taken up, and only later, when 
various disciplines had taken structural linguistics as a 
methodological model and become versions of structuralism, did it 
become evident that the semiology Saussure postulated had begun 
to develop. At this point he became a powerful influence, partly 
because he had written little and because the program outlined for 
semiotics seemed easy to grasp: linguistics was to serve as example 
and its basic concepts applied to other domains of social and 
cultural life. The semiotician is attempting to grasp the system 
(langue) which underlies and makes possible meaningful events 
(parole). He is concerned with the system as a functioning totality 
(synchronic analysis) not with the historical provenence of its 
various elements (diachronic analysis), and he must describe two 
kinds of relations: contrasts or oppositions between signs 
(paradigmatic relations) and possibilities of combination through 
which signs create larger units (syntagmatic relations). 
Peirce is a very different case. A wayward philosophical 
genius, denied tenure by Johns Hopkins, he devoted himself 
wholeheartedly to «semeiotic,» as he called it, which would be the 
science of sciences, since «the entire universe is perfused with signs 
if it is not composed entirely of signs)? If the universe consists en- 
tirely of signs (and he argued that even man was a sign-not the 
word man but man as category or individual), then there is a great 
deal of classifying to do. Peirce's voluminous writings on semiotics 
remained unpublished and unreadable until recently. Only with the 
growth of semiotics in the last few years have our levels of tolerance 
risen to the point where we can read Peirce, but it is still difficult, 
since the laboriously produced Collected Papers did not recognize 
semiotics as a field of enquiry and disrupted by their arrangement 
Peirce's attempts to constitute it through his writing. The failings 
of this edition have doubtless confirmed many in the view that 
«who steals my Peirce steals trash.» His revaluation will not be ac- 
complished until the new, semiotically-oriented edition of his 
works appears. 
Peirce's writings are full of proliferating categories (in arguing 
that men are like other signs he cited the fact that both men and 
signs procreate): distinctions combine to produce such species as 
«rhematic indexical sinsign.» There are, he decided, ten 2




trichotomies by which signs can be distinguished, giving us 59,049 
classes of sign. Fortunately, there are redundancies and dependen- 
cies so that one only need deal with 66 categories, but even this has 
proved too much for all but the most masochistic theorists, and this 
excessive or impractical character of Peirce's ambitious construc- 
tions has prevented him from exercizing the influence he might 
have. Today, it is becoming increasingly evident that he is a radical 
theorist of the first magnitude. 
Peirce is a philosophical pragmatist. He defines truth not as 
correspondence with some objective reality but as what works: to 
call a judgement objectively valid is to predict that eventually «all 
the world will agree in it.»5 Reality is what is presented in the opi- 
nion which will prevail. Peirce shows, in an argument worthy of 
Nietzsche or Derrida, that «external reality» is something we 
postulate in order to account for our conviction that investigation 
will lead to agreement. The reality of things is the postulate we 
make in order to explain our belief that people will, after discussion 
and investigation of alternatives, when all the evidence is in, reach 
agreement. We account for this conviction by assuming that there 
is an independent, external reality that will induce agreement. 
«This involves,» Peirce says, «no error, and is convenient for cer- 
tain purposes, but it does not follow that it affords the point of 
view from which it is proper to look at the matter in order to 
understand its true philosophy. o' 
Those who do not know Peirce well and simply cite him to but- 
tress an argument sometimes assume that since he is known as a 
pragmatist he must be above all a practical man, a believer in brute 
facts, suitable guru for a practical American semiotics which would 
repudiate the excessive theorizing of Europeans, especially the 
French. On the contrary, Peirce, much more than Saussure, is the 
brilliant, speculative theorist, delighted to pursue ideas wherever 
they may take him. Deciding that the answer to the question «what 
is man?» is that he is a symbol or sign, Peirce works towards a 
more specific answer by asking in what respects a man differs from 
the word six (this is a fascinating lecture in which, incidentally, he 
concludes that the differences are primarily physiological).' 
Peirce and Saussure are very different (at sixes and sevens, one 
might say) but recent theoretical work, such as Umberto Eco's 
Theory of Semiotics and the papers by Sebeok and Eco in the 1975 
Peirce symposium, has shown that their teachings are congruent or 
complementary on a surprising number of matters.' Indeed, a ma- 
jor achievement of recent semiotic theory is to have made it im- 3
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possible to oppose Peirce to Saussure in a simplistic way. As 
Thomas Sebeok, doyen of American semioticians, has noted, «the 
distinction between the traditions has lost its force.»' Occasionally 
someone still will appeal to one parent against the other, as children 
trying to get away with something will do, but usually this can be 
shown to rest on a misunderstanding of Peirce: that he is practical 
while Saussure is theoretical. There are at least four important 
points on which the approaches of these two founders of semiotics 
meet and form a tradition. The first two points are not directly 
related to the study of literature but the last two are. 
1. The first point is presented by Peirce's claim that «the en- 
tire universe is perfused with signs if it is not composed entirely of 
signs.»'° Since the late nineteenth century, a series of eminent 
thinkers has insisted that our world be discussed in terms not of 
physical objects and events but of social and cultural facts: objects 
and events with meaning, which is to say, signs. Philosophers, 
sociologists, psychologists have shown that even the most elemen- 
tary processes of perception themselves are already semiotic, in- 
volving social and cultural matrices, categories, distinctions. It has 
become almost banal truth that there is no perception, in the sense 
of unmediated presence of objects: the perceptual object is already 
a sign. We perceive an example of a chair. 
Semiotics can take no credit for these discoveries about the 
symbolic nature of all human experience, which have been made in 
other fields. Semiotics is the systematic culmination of this perspec- 
tive. As Peirce says, it is not that we have objects on the one hand 
and thoughts on the other; it is, rather, that we have signs 
everywhere, «some more mental and spontaneous, others more 
material and regular.»" The task of semiotics is to describe the 
various systems of signs and sign processes which make up the 
world and, in particular, to study the ways in which semiotic 
systems and activities create the cultural units which are the objects 
of our world. 
Here the basic semiotic principle is what Saussure called the ar- 
bitrary nature of the sign. Occasionally people think this means on- 
ly that the signifiers of forms used to express concepts are arbi- 
trary: determined by convention rather than by any natural affin- 
ity between form and concept. To restrict the principle in this way 
is to fall into an error which Saussure frequently warned against, 
the error of thinking of a language as a nomenclature which sup- 
plies its own names or forms to denote concepts or classes given in 
advance. Students and teachers of languages are, of course, only 4




too aware that each language has not only its own system of 
signifiers but also its own system of signifieds, its own concepts. 
Languages articulate the world in different ways, which is why 
translation cannot be undertaken by looking up each foreign word 
in a dictionary and writing down the English word which stands for 
the same concepts-it doesn't work because the concepts are never 
quite the same. Each language articulates a system of signifieds 
which are, in Saussure's terms, arbitrary and conventional: ar- 
bitrary because not determined by an independent reality (French 
and English are equally valid articulations of the world); conven- 
tional because however natural they seem they are always determin- 
ed by social rule, semiotic convention. This is the fundamental 
principle of semiotics. 
It is perhaps worth adding here that the principle of the ar- 
bitrary nature of the sign should not be confused with the so-called 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language determines thought. On the 
contrary, semiotics insists that there is a whole range of cultural ac- 
tivities and practices-not just language-semiotic in nature, which 
create categories that will find a place as signifieds in natural 
languages. Thus the rules of basketball create categories which 
English then names as «dunk-shot» or «foul.» Clearly it is not the 
case that because «foul» is a sign of English there will be fouls in 
basketball. The rules of the game are a semiotic sub-system which in- 
teracts with the language. For semiotics, we live among a series of 
systems of this kind which articulate a world. What we think of as 
things or events are semiotic constructs, cultural units. 
2. I have already broached the second point which defines the 
heritage of Peirce and Saussure and which bears on the relation of 
verbal signs to non-verbal signs. Peirce, in one of his ten 
trichotomies, distinguished symbols (which were purely conven- 
tional and best represented by linguistic signs) from indices (where 
signifier is related to signified by causality or contiguity) and icons 
(where there is a relation of resemblance). Saussure too noted that 
there were different sorts of signs, but he argued that however 
natural the relationship between signifier and signified may appear 
in non-verbal signs, there is always a convention which semiotics 
must investigate." Semiotics must always resist the tendency 
among members of a culture to take their signs as natural, as based 
on a non-conventional relation. Recent work on Peirce's concept of 
the icon by Sebeok and Eco has shown how much Peirce agreed 
with Saussure: " whether we are dealing with maps, paintings or 
diagrams, every material image «is largely conventional in its mode 5
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of representation.»" It is only after taking for granted a great 
many complicated conventions that one can suggest that a map ac- 
tually resembles what it represents. The task of semiotics is to un- 
cover these conventions on which our everyday activities depend. 
The principle of the arbitrary and conventional nature of all signs is 
the guarantee against sloppiness and delusion. 
I have said that these two points did not relate directly to the 
study of literature, but they do confirm something which students 
of literature already know to be the case. If a poem tells us that the 
beloved wore a silver gown, we do not think that this sequence 
simply represents an extra-linguistic reality which has determined 
the sequence. We know that what is represented here is itself part of 
a sign system, so we ask what this means and how it fits in with the 
rest of the poem. In literature we are free from the delusion that 
signs are determined (and accounted for) by realities which are 
simply there prior to any semiosis. Semiotics is a codification of 
this understanding of sign systems which literary critics, for the 
most part, already have. 
3. The third point on which Peirce and Saussure would agree 
is that semiotics is not a method of interpretation which can be ap- 
plied to a text to produce new readings. It is, rather, a theoretical 
framework within which the study of signifying processes of all 
kinds takes place. It asks not «what does this work mean?» but 
«how is the process of signification organized here?» It is impor- 
tant to note, though, that rigorous attention to the signifying pro- 
cedures that a work establishes and to the work's own representa- 
tion of the signifying process can yield subtle and penetrating inter- 
pretations of literary works. This kind of criticism, which involves 
a scrupulous analysis or taking apart of the logic of signification in 
a text, is now often called «deconstruction.» 
4. Finally, by posing the problem of what kind of sign pro- 
cesses are at work in texts, semiotics ought to have one very impor- 
tant consequence: it ought to make criticism confront a problem 
which it has always tried to sweep under the rug, the problem of the 
relationship between signification and communication. 
This is a central issue in semiotics. Those who see semiotics as 
studying communication are content to think of meaning as what is 
communicated by signs, and this view has its virtues in some cases. 
We are not likely to object to the notion that a word's meaning is 
what it means to speakers of the language, but those who want 
semiotics to deal, as Peirce did, with all kinds of correlations 
among semiotic phenomena, find that the attempt to treat meaning 6




as what is communicated does not suffice in practice. As soon as we 
look at actual texts or situations we begin to make discoveries, to 
see relationships and correlations which had not previously been 
noticed and which have not therefore been communicating 
anything to anyone. If one were to study the behavior of 
undergraduates-highly codified and ritualized, always com- 
municating to those in the know-we might discover, for example, 
that the fad of «streaking» coincided with the Watergate 
cover -up." Whatever we think of this correlation, it seems wrong 
to reject it on the grounds that this meaning was not communicated 
to spectators at the time. When we come to literature, the critic cer- 
tainly will not be content to reject a pattern or correlation he has 
just discovered on the ground that it has not been communicating 
meaning to previous readers. On the contrary, literary criticism as a 
semiotic activity has been predicated on the attempt to discover and 
interpret new patterns, structures, and correlations. 
However, criticism has usually tried to avoid facing this 
semiotic problem. The New Criticism, by identifying the inten- 
tional and affective fallacies, simply denied the relevance of a com- 
municational perspective and assumed that literature involved 
signification which was inherent in the structures of the work and 
which patient study might discover. Recent ventures into what has 
come to be called «reader-response criticism,» whether 
sophisticated as in Stanley Fish or bathetic as in versions based on 
ego psychology, simply reverse the claim: there is no signification, 
no meaning to be discovered. Meaning is simply the experience of 
each reader, what is communicated to him. This is not only false to 
literary criticism, which has been able to make discoveries about 
meaning that have become part of our knowledge of literature, but 
also false to the classroom situation on which it claims to focus. 
What we find in a classroom, when you give a class a poem, is not 
25 students projecting their unique personalities onto works and 
each producing a complex interpretation which precisely reflects his 
personality, but rather varying degrees of incomprehension, inter- 
pretations carried over from previous classes, etc.-until discussion 
begins; patterns, structures, and correlations are pointed out; and 
students begin to make discoveries about meaning and come to see 
interpretive possibilities which their teachers had not envisioned. 
That we are dealing with complex structures and an interpretive 
competence becomes clear in the work of Stanley Fish. Though 
Fish says he is recording the experience of an informed reader like 
himself, that is improbable, for any real reader, as he started on his 7
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14th «self-consuming artifact,» would not have the experience Fish 
describes-the experience of being surprised and disturbed to see 
the work question its own categories and negate its own claims. '6 
On the contrary, he would expect this and be pleasantly gratified to 
see his expectations confirmed. What Fish presents as meaning 
communicated is in fact significance discovered. 
Semiotics, with its focus on the problem of meaning, ought to 
make critics aware of the necessity of working out a dialectic be- 
tween signification and communication, constructing a theory that 
accounts for the possibility of discovering meaning, instead of 
either rejecting the communicational perspective or else arguing 
that criticism has been an elitist activity which ought to stop study- 
ing works and simply record what they mean to those who have not 
yet learned to read carefully and skillfully. 
So far I have proceeded without examples, except for that bare 
reference to streaking, and to put some clothes on this naked form I 
should like to conclude with some remarks about a work well 
known to most readers, a work which our culture has interpreted as 
central to our definition of the nature and situation of man: 
Oedipus Rex. Freud, one of millions of enthusiastic readers, 
describes the play as follows: 
The action of the play consists of nothing other than the pro- 
cess of revealing, with cunning delays and ever-mounting ex- 
citement (a process that can be likened to the work of a 
psychoanalysis) that Oedipus himself is the murderer of 
Laius, but further that he is the son of the murdered man and 
of Jocasta. Appalled at the abomination he has unwittingly 
perpetrated, Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his home. '7 
Freud emphasizes that the play involves the bringing to light, the 
revelation, of an awful deed-the event par excellence-and this 
event is so powerful that it imposes its meaning (Oedipus is «ap- 
palled»), irrespective of any intention by the actor. This is what has 
always been communicated by the play: the event is revealed; it 
makes Oedipus guilty; and he attains true human dignity in accep- 
ting the meaning imposed by the revealed event. 
But this reading fails to account for an interesting element in 
the play, discussed in a different perspective by Sandor Goodhart. " 
When Oedipus first asks whether anyone witnessed Laius's death 
he is told, «All died save one who fled in terror and could tell us on- 
ly one clear fact. He said that robbers, not one but many, fell in 8




with the King's party and killed them.» And later, when Oedipus 
begins to wonder whether he may in fact have killed Laius, he tells 
Jocasta that all hangs on the testimony of this witness, whom they 
await. «You say he spoke of robbers, that robbers killed him. If he 
still says robbers, it was not I. One is not the same as many; but if 
he speaks of one lone traveller, there is no escape: the finger points 
to me.» To which Jocasta answers, «Oh, but I assure you, that was 
what he said. He cannot go back on it now; the whole town heard 
it, not only I.» 
The only witness has publicly told a story that is incompatible 
with Oedipus's guilt. This possibility of innocence is never effec- 
tively eliminated, for by the time the witness arrives Oedipus is busy 
discovering that he is the son of Laius and asks only about his 
birth, not about the murder. The witness is never asked whether the 
murderers were one or many. 
I am not suggesting that Oedipus was really innocent and has 
been falsely convicted for 2400 years. I am interested in the 
significance of the fact that the possibility of innocence is never 
properly dispelled: the whole action of this play is the revelation of 
the dastardly deed, but we are never confronted with the deed 
itself, given the testimony of the eyewitness. Oedipus himself and 
all his readers are convinced that he is guilty, but our conviction 
does not come from revelation of the deed. Where does it come 
from? From a repetition of prophecies, from signs. It was pro- 
phesied that Laius would be killed by his son; it was prophesied 
that Oedipus would kill his father; and Tiresias, asked who is guilty 
of murder, prophesies that it will prove to be Oedipus. Given this 
conjunction of signs, this textual interweaving of prophecies, when 
Oedipus discovers that he is the son of Laius he leaps to the conclu- 
sion that he is the murderer. 
He becomes the murderer of his father not by a violent act that 
is brought to light but by deeming the act to have taken place: by 
assuming that what the signs claim must have happened, by ap- 
propriating what the signs represent. The network of signs which 
the prophecies have woven leads to the affirmation of the event 
which those signs predict. And we as readers cannot escape this 
process either: the text compels us to affirm the truth of the par- 
ricide. 
I offer this beginning of a reading of Oedipus to support my 
claim that literary criticism must not limit itself to what has been 
communicated but must preserve the possibility of discovering 
meaning by reinterpreting elements previously disregarded. But 9
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from a semiotic point of view what is important here is the play's 
implicit commentary on the relation between meaning and event, 
between signs and the «realities» often thought to be independent 
of them. On the one hand, in working toward revelation of the 
murder, the play implicitly claims that the revealed event will deter- 
mine meaning. If it took place, then Oedipus is a parricide; and the 
play compels readers to affirm, with Oedipus, that because it did, 
he is. But the play also shows that this deed is not revealed as such 
but inferred from signs. We are given not a deed from which we in- 
fer meaning but meaning from which we infer a deed. Peirce iden- 
tified «external reality» as what is inferred from our belief in agree- 
ment, and we find much the same position here. We are not wrong 
to think Oedipus is guilty, but it can be shown that the event which 
we take as imposing is already a consequence of signs and not a 
reality independent of semiosis. In the beginning was the word. We 
are not wrong to think that there are events, that they create mean- 
ing, but whenever we try to grasp a thing or event said to have 
determined meaning, we discover that the thing or event is already 
a product of signs, already enmeshed in semiosis. We cannot get 
outside textuality. 
What I offer here is not a semiotic reading of Oedipus-there 
is no such thing- but a reading attentive to the logic of significa- 
tion and in that sense a reading made possible by semiotics. Here as 
elsewhere, one consequence of semiotics is the demonstration that 
events, the originary events which we always seek to discover, are 
themselves already semiotic consequences. 
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